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A content analysis of social media users’ reaction to 





The present study seeks to explore social media users’ reactions to religious disinformation in 
Bangladesh. Public comments were collected from the relevant Facebook posts related to an 
online religious disinformation that took place in April 2019 and analyzed following a 
qualitative content analysis method. The three key findings of this research are: (a) Social 
media users react to disinformation more emotionally than reasonably; (b) more users show 
diverse forms of destructive reactions when they encounter disinformation; and (c) although 
more users have strong reasoning skills, only a few users show constructive reactions after 
encountering disinformation. These results indicate the presence of hate spin that tend to 
marginalize religious minorities in both social media and society. This study has limitations 
related to the data analysis and generalization problem of the findings. The research findings 
would help both academics to understand the multifaceted online religious disinformation and 
users’ engagement with it, and policymakers to take effective measures to control interreligious 
discontents. 
 







In March 2020, the Bangladesh government shut down all public institutions and assemblies 
including mosques to prevent the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Against 
this official declaration, many Islamic clerics, popularly known as Mullah, Imam, Maulvi, 
preached on Facebook and YouTube that the COVID-19 pandemic is a curse only for the 
infidels, and the Muslims will be exempted from it (Rashid, 2020). This disinformation spread 
across the country within a few hours. Believing such claims thousands of Muslims occupied 
the street and protested the government’s decision. Such episodes of intentional rumoring and 
rumor-mongering are taking place around the world irrespective of countries. Disinformation 
is commonplace in human history, but social media disinformation is a novel phenomenon. Its 
prime reason is the transformations in the communication system and the benefits that digital 
media are offering to the people. Consequently, the internet-based media is thriving with its 
multimodal communication, and traditional media is struggling to survive (Hong, 2012; Lysak 
et al., 2012; Stassen, 2010): Bangladesh is no exception to this (Fahad, 2014; Mohabat, 2019). 
The country has 30 million social media users in 2020, which is almost 22% of the total 
population (Kemp, 2020), and Facebook is the most used social media platform with 94% of 
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the total social media users (Social Media, 2019). The political impact of Facebook in 
Bangladesh is also remarkable. Recent sociopolitical movements, such as the Shahbag 
movement in 2013, No-vat on Education movement in 2015, the Quota Reform movement, and 
the Road Safety movement in 2018, were solely based on Facebook (see Ahmed, 2018; 
Rahman, 2018). In these cases, social media outshined traditional media, demonstrating its 
rising power and impact in Bangladesh society. 
Disinformation has also gained new momentum worldwide in recent years thanks to the 
growing popularity of social media. Incidents of disinformation-led-violence is commonplace 
in South Asian countries as well. However, unlike the rest of the world, most of the 
disinformation is intertwined with religion. For example, after 2015, India has experienced 
more than a hundred mob lynchings caused by social media disinformation (Banaji et al., 
2019). Banaji et al. (2019) suggest that mounting sociopolitical crises, strategic discrimination 
against the minorities (mostly against the Muslims), and nourishing the deep-rooted 
socioreligious superstitions are the main causes of the proliferating social media disinformation 
and violence in India. The state-sponsored hate campaigns against the Muslim minorities 
bolsters the gau-rakshaks (“cow protectors” or “cow vigilantes”), who leverage WhatsApp 
disinformation to terrorize and lynch the Muslims (Mukherjee, 2020). In Myanmar, Facebook 
with 99.4% of the country’s total social media users has become an ideal instrument of 
disinformation for the Buddhist nationalists mainly against the Muslim population and the 
Rohingya minorities (The Economist, 2020). Bangladesh’s scenario is almost identical (Al-
Zaman, 2019). Around 152 million people of the country are Muslims, which is 90.39% of the 
total population, meaning most of the netizens are Muslims as well. Recently, the country has 
become a fertile land of religious disinformation and disinformation-led violence (Bay, 2018). 
The incidents of online communal disinformation, such as Ramu violence in 2012, Comilla 
and Pabna violence in 2013, Nasirnagar attack in 2016, Thakurpara attack in 2017, and Bhola 
violence in 2019, are becoming commonplace, disturbing the social peace and interreligious 
harmony (see Al-Zaman, 2019; Haque, 2019; Minar & Naher, 2018; Alif & Rahman, 2019). It 
is to note that social media does not implant the seeds of violence in a society. Rather, the 
ideology of violence is rooted in society, and social media assists it (Arun, 2015). 
Although episodes of online religious disinformation are ample in Bangladesh, the 
academic endeavor has failed to properly identify its extent, its impacts on society, and its 
differences from ordinary rumors. For example, disinformation-led communal violence is 
addressed as just a rumor-incident (Minar & Naher, 2018). Disinformation is often addressed 
as a sub-category of fake news as well (Haque, 2019). It hints that disinformation is yet to be 
considered as a separate concept in academic discourse in Bangladesh. Considering its 
relevance and importance, the present research aims to understand how social media users 
interact with religious disinformation, emphasizing their online reactions (i.e., the language 
they use). The analysis mainly focuses on users’ behavioral expressions through language in 
discourse. 
 




The definition of disinformation is a contending issue in both philosophy and communication 
studies. The PHEME Project defines disinformation as a type of rumor, along with 
misinformation, speculation, and controversy (Derczynski et al., 2015). While misinformation 
is an honest mistake, disinformation is nothing but misleading information that is intended to 
deceive people (Fallis, 2014). 
Disinformation has three main characteristics: (a) disinformation springs up when the 
information process is defective (Floridi, 1996); (b) misinformation turns into disinformation 
when its source is aware of its falsehood (Floridi, 2005) and (c) disinformation is purposefully 
conveyed to mislead (Floridi, 2011). The last characteristic makes disinformation more similar 
to lying (Fallis, 2011). Also, Fetzer (2004a) suggests that disinformation is nothing but lying. 
Fallis (2014) on the other hand postulates that lying and disinforming may not always be the 
same things as lying without disinforming is very much possible. Rather, he emphasizes the 
intention to deceive others as the most basic indicator of disinformation. Besides, he 
acknowledges that lying is the most notable type of disinformation. (Fallis, 2014). Fallis (2014, 
2015) again comments that it is possible for disinformation to become true, i.e., true 
disinformation. It seems that he emphasizes two things: (a) disinformation is always misleading 
and intentional, and (b) disinformation and lying are not always positively correlated with each 
other. The first proposition indicates that the source of disinformation produces it intentionally 
and disinformation guide the public in the wrong direction. The second proposition indicates 
that disinformation does not always convey the wrong information to guide the public in the 
wrong direction, and thus, disinformation and lying would be different at some points. 
However, if we take the idea of Floridi (2011) for granted that information must be true, then 
disinformation, which is anything but information according to Dretske (1981), might not have 
truth value: thus, disinformation should be false information. It contradicts the idea of true 
disinformation. 
Fallis (2014) categorizes disinformation into three types: visual disinformation, true 
disinformation, and side effect disinformation. Referring to Fetzer (2004b), he also states that 
“unlike lying, disinformation does not have to be a statement” (138), such as visual 
disinformation (e.g., doctored photographs and videos). However, his concept of statement 
seems narrow since a statement may incorporate not only written or spoken language but also 
visual language, such as photos and videos. To better understand disinformation, we should 
focus on an important question: why people believe disinformation? It leads us to the idea that 
disinformation is a persuasive story. 
Individuals communicate with others through stories (Fisher, 1987). A compelling story is 
an easier way to convince people and make sense of an event. To be convincing and sensible, 
a story should have rhetorical virtues: ethos, logos, and pathos (Aristotle, 1991). 
Disinformation often takes the camouflage of persuasive stories to persuade its targets. 
However, Difonzo & Bordia (2006) argues that urban legend is more connected to storytelling, 
while disinformation is more to ambiguous or threatening situations. This view seems 
incomplete. In Bangladesh, for example, almost every disinformation is accompanied by a 
compelling story (Al-Zaman, 2019, 2020b). Disinformation stories are intended to guide 
individuals to alter their viewpoints and engage in different actions. 
Disinformation as a story may shift individuals from a rational-world paradigm to a 
narrative-world paradigm (Griffin, 2011). The rational-world paradigm primarily considers 
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humans as essentially rational, who make decisions based on the arguments. On the contrary, 
the narrative-world paradigm addresses people as essentially storytellers, who make decisions 
based on (good) reasons (Fisher, 1985). Unlike the rational-world view, the narrative-world 
view, which may include disinformation, sees the world as a set of stories (Griffin, 2011): 
emotion plays an important role in stories. The persuasiveness of disinformation is thus based 
on the coherence and apparent fidelity of its story, and the emotional appeal it can make. Also, 
individuals tend to accept stories that match his/her prior set of beliefs and values (Jameson, 
2001). Therefore, the criterion of a successful disinformation is that it should be a compelling 
and carefully constructed story that is somehow related to public belief and values. Important 
to note that rumor, misinformation, disinformation, and fake news are used interchangeably in 
scholarly writings (Duffy et al., 2019; Jr et al., 2018; Muigai, 2019; Tandoc et al., 2020; Wardle 
& Derakhshan, 2017). In recent years, besides information, social media has become a good 
source of disinformation as well. Increased consumption of unverified information from 
various social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, makes the users more 
susceptible to disinformation (Newman, 2011; Newman et al., 2013; Shearer & Gottfried, 
2017; Turcotte et al., 2015). 
 
3. Social Media Users’ Reaction to Disinformation 
 
How individuals perceive and respond to disinformation? In the rumor transmission theory, 
Buckner (1965) identifies three positions that individuals take after encountering 
disinformation. The critical set suggests that some individuals have more intelligence and 
experience so they can evaluate information, identify deceptive facts, and exclude that before 
transmitting it to others. In the uncritical set, individuals do the opposite mainly due to their 
self-interest, lack of knowledge, and/or experience regarding the information. In the 
transmission set, however, an individual’s critical ability is thought to be irrelevant as s/he only 
transmit disinformation to others. The nature of transmission and response to disinformation 
thus depend on which set the individual takes (Roeckelein, 2006). Transmission of 
disinformation usually follows two different patterns. First, disinformation is transmitted from 
individual to individual serially in a series of single interactions: it is called chain transmission. 
Second, in the network transmission, many individuals get disinformation from a single source 
(Buckner, 1965). In the digital age, network transmission of disinformation becomes more 
commonplace thanks to the growing popularity of online communication and digital 
information consumption. Therefore, understanding users’ online communication behavior is 
imperative. 
Several researches explored how people react to misinformation, disinformation, and fake 
news. Mookherjee (2019) categorized public reactions to misinformation into three broad 
types: affective, cognitive, and behavioral. Affective reaction deals with what misinformation 
causes to people’s feelings, and cognitive reaction deals with the idea that “exposure to 
misinformation does not only affect our emotions but it also affects our cognition and style of 
thinking” (Mookherjee, 2019, p. 15). In contrast, behavioral reaction indicates that 
misinformation changes our behavioral patterns and how we act: it may prompt undesirable 
behavior as well, such as aggressiveness and avoidance. 
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Like the present study, a few previous studies also dealt with the behavioral aspect of 
people’s reaction to disinformation. For example, Grande-Allen et al. (2020) observed that 
people usually do four things when they encounter fake news on online platforms: “Some 
outright ignored it, some took it at face value, some investigated whether it was true, and some 
were suspicious of it but then chose to ignore it.” In another similar study, Tandoc et al. (2020) 
explored that most social media users either ignore or offer no corrections to disinformation 
unless it is strongly relevant to themselves and/or people they are related to. In most cases, 
users are largely incapable to distinguish information and disinformation and transmit it. Its 
reason could be that the novelty in misinformation attracts users more often, so they likely to 
transmit misinformation twice more than true information (as cited in Mookherjee, 2019). 
Similarly, Verdizada (2017) shows social media content with false information gets more 
attention from the users than the true information. Kumar et al. (2016) shows the human 
capability of detecting disinformation is weaker than an automated classifier. Like the findings 
of Tandoc et al. (2020) and Kumar et al. (2016), this study also hints at users’ less capability 
of identifying disinformation. On the other hand, Altay et al. (2020) inferred that very few 
people share misinformation as it may hurt their reputation. However, this inference fails to 
distinguish between knowingly and unknowingly sharing. 
Although these studies focused on users’ misinformation sharing behavior, none of them 
discusses their analytical skills, reasoning capabilities, and/or emotional expressions. Why 
some users believe disinformation and some do not? This may be because of their unequal 
reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are based on three basic components: “the available 
information, the cognitive information brought to bear, and generated inference” (Kurtz et al., 
1999, p. 145). That means, the users with strong reasoning skills would present relevant 
information, operationalize their cognition, and make an inference, whereas users with weak 
reasoning skills are possibly unable to perform one or more of these actions. 
Why some users react constructively to disinformation while some react destructively? One 
reason for this could be the difference in emotional attachment to the disinformation: the more 
the users are attached to disinformation emotionally, the more intense their behavior could be. 
That means disinformation about sensitive issues and issues of public interests in a particular 
society may generate more intense and wide reactions. Arun (2015) and Mukherjee (2020) 
show WhatsApp disinformation incites aggressive behavior among its believers. However, 
their studies do not present the definitions and characteristics of aggressive behavior and the 
description of users’ immediate (verbal) reactions to online disinformation. Aggressive 
behavior is nothing but destructive behavior. It has two broader forms: indication of hostility 
and verbal aggressiveness (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009). Hostility includes “irritability, negativity, 
resentment, and suspicion” and verbal aggressiveness includes “character attacks, competence 
attacks, ridicule, teasing, profanity, attacks on physical appearance, threats, malediction, 
background attack, and non-verbal behavior, that is raising the middle finger, sticking out the 
tongue, rolling the eyes” (Infante & Rancer, 1996; Infante & Wigley, 1986; Littlejohn & Foss, 
2009, p. 46). Social media users display manifold destructive behavior (Bekiari & Pachi, 2017) 
due to four primary reasons: psychopathology, disdain for other, social learning of aggression, 
and deficiency in argumentative skills (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009, pp. 46–47). We have already 
seen that destructive behavior led by social media disinformation (e.g., offline violence and 
lynching) is commonplace in contemporary South Asia (Al-Zaman, 2020a, 2019, 2020b; Arun, 
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2015; Banaji et al., 2019; Mukherjee, 2020). It is important to mention that constructive 
reactions are more related to strong reasoning skills and destructive reactions are more related 
to weak reasoning skills, although they often overlap. 
As we see, previous literature inadequately deals with disinformation from the aspect of 
users: what are the patterns of users’ language, and what it hints about their attitude towards 
disinformation. Also, religious disinformation occupies little space in previous studies. As a 
result, it is still unknown how social media users react to religious disinformation. Therefore, 
this study attempts to answer the following question: 
 




4.1. Case selection 
 
This study dealt with a prominent case of social media disinformation. The incident took place 
on 4 April 2019 in Narail, a southwestern district of Bangladesh. A Hindu man named 
Rajkumar allegedly defamed the Prophet (PBUH) in a Facebook post. However, like many 
previous incidents, this one was also a disinformation to humiliate a Hindu man. A day before 
the incident, Robiul Ahmid, a local mullah wrote on his Facebook profile: “Do you want to 
harass any Hindu man? Open a Facebook ID using his name and photo, then you defame Islam 
from that fake ID making him a scapegoat. Afterward, beat him heavily.” Ariful Islam, another 
local mullah commented on the post: “I did the same thing once to ostracize a Hindu infidel. 
Now, I am going to apply the same therapy against Rajkumar very soon.” This conversation 
suggests that Ariful Islam produced the disinformation to humiliate Rajkumar. Without proper 
verification, this disinformation was widely reported and shared on Facebook. It caused an 
immediate online outcry that led to an offline crowd, demanding brutal punishment of the 
accused. This incident of disinformation was selected purposefully due to three reasons. One, 
it is a well-known disinformation that has strong and explicit evidence (e.g., screenshots of the 
conversation and Facebook IDs of the mullahs), unlike the previous disinformation incidents 
like Ramu violence and Nasirnagar attack (see Al-Zaman, 2019). Two, originating in social 
media, this disinformation had offline impacts, i.e., demonstrations. Three, a few national 
media outlets reported this social media disinformation considering its importance and impacts. 
 
4.2. Sources and collection of data 
 
I collected the data from Facebook, the dominant social media platform in Bangladesh. Total 
seven Facebook pages: Daily Kaler Kantho, Daily Janakantho, Islam-er Dawat, Islami Chhatra 
Shibir, Narail-er Alo, and Mufti Abul Kalam Azad Bashar Supporters Group posted seven 
contents related to this incident. Of these contents, four were videos and three were text-based 
reports: Each of their information was biased toward the disinformation and none of them 
disclosed the true information publicly. As this research is designed to analyze users’ verbal 
reactions to the disinformation so only the public comments were analyzed, excluding the 
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Facebook Reactions (i.e., like, love, wow, care, sad, haha, angry). The seven selected Facebook 
posts earned 1,339 comments between 4 April to 7 April 2019. At first, I extracted all the 
comments from the public posts using Netvizz, a widely-used Facebook data extractor (Rieder, 
2013), and compiled them in a CSV file. The whole corpus contained raw/unfiltered data, and 
I randomly selected 457 comments from the corpus, which was 34.13% of the total comments. 
I excluded the links, stickers, photos, and emoticons from the sample due to their irrelevance 
to the research question. The final sample was 437. The unit of analysis of this study was the 
comments. Random sampling is the most reliable sampling for media content, according to 
Krippendorff (2013). He further suggests that for sampling texts in content analysis, the sample 
should be more related to the research question than to the accurate representation of the 
population. From both points of view, the sample was reliable. 
 
4.3. Data analysis and coding technique 
 
After selecting the sample, I coded the data. Two basic types of coding are (a) manifest coding 
based on selected keywords and phrases, and (b) latent or semantic coding based on semantic 
themes (Neuman, 2014). Each has its limitations. Therefore, both were applied to code the data. 
Qualitative analysis requires inductive coding (Given, 2008), while deductive coding is more 
appropriate for quantitative data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The coding was done manually in 
Microsoft Office Word and Excel. An intra/interrater reliability test is difficult for a single 
coder. In such a condition, one way is to repeat the coding in two different times (Time 1 and 
Time 2) to determine the reliability of the codes (Mackey & Gass, 2005). Following this 
technique, I coded the data, and the Krippendorff’s Alpha value of intra-coder reliability was 
found substantial. Two notes are important here: (a) While analyzing the data, the religions of 
the users were listed as well, based on either their Facebook profile name or information from 
the profile; and (b) for a better understanding of the findings, translated quotes from the dataset 




The two themes emerged from the dataset: emotion-driven reactions and reason-based 
reactions. The first one suggests that users’ reaction to disinformation is mainly emotion-
driven, while the second one shows that in many cases, users react to disinformation based on 
reason than emotion. I found 445 instances in the dataset in favor of the themes. Of those, 
emotion-driven reaction had 276 (62.02%) instances and reason-based reaction had 169 
(37.98%) instances. The percentages show that users’ emotional reactions are more palpable 
than their reasoning ability. 
 
5.1. Emotion-driven reactions 
 
While social media users react to disinformation and interact with other users, they express 
their emotions in various forms that can be categorized into two types: destructive reactions 




5.1.1. Destructive reaction 
 
A total of 256 instances of destructive reactions are found in the dataset that constitute 92.75% 
of emotion-driven reactions. Destructive reaction primarily includes four specific expressions: 
hatred, extreme anger, moderate anger, and frustration. Hatred is the most common destructive 
reaction that includes vile language, anti-Hindu and anti-Muslim sentiment, demand for brutal 
punishment, threatening, and xenophobia. Most of the vile language targets the accused as well 
as the whole Hindu community for “undermining” Islam. In a very few cases, Muslims and 
Islam are attacked verbally. Some popular words and phrases used frequently to admonish the 
accused man are kuttar baccha (son of a bitch), khankir pola (son of a whore), motherchod 
(motherfucker), malaun (accursed), and jaroj (bastard). For example, “Bring that motherfucker 
[the accused] and let us bury him.” With this disinformation, anti-religious sentiments also 
flourish. Many Muslim users who ostensibly consider the four major religions (i.e., Hinduism, 
Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity) as rivals engage in demeaning them. A very small 
number of users criticize Islam. 
Anger is another common destructive reaction. The language used in such comments hint 
at the degree of users’ anger. Instances of both extreme and moderate anger are observed in the 
dataset. I address extreme anger when a comment contains intense expressions, such as fasi 
dao (hang him), shirocched koro (behead him), khun koro (kill him): “Hang him in an open 
place.” Besides, moderate anger contains expressions that are not too intense, such as bichar 
chai (we demand justice), upojukto shashti chai (we demand proper punishment). 
Frustration also comes out when users react to disinformation. Their frustrations are mainly 
related to the law that often lets the individual unpunished who commits blasphemy. According 
to a user: “Ah! What Muslim state it is where we Muslims need to protest and demand 
punishment of the infidels.” For some, Bangladesh society is becoming unfavorable for the 
minorities due to intensifying Muslim-domination, and for others, it is becoming a Hindu-state. 
Another group is disappointed with the eroding brotherhood among Muslims. They also 
suspect that the failure of Muslim brotherhood is the main reason for the alleged Hindu-
revivalism in contemporary Bangladesh. 
 
5.1.2. Constructive reaction 
 
Compared to destructive reactions, instances of constructive expressions are relatively scarce 
in the dataset (n=20, 7.25% of expression-driven reaction). Constructive reactions express the 
words of benevolence, peace, and congruence. It includes two sets of instances. One, users 
spread the virtues of Islam and Hinduism against the reported disinformation. Two, users urge 
others not to exemplify this single reported event to generate communal disharmony, rather to 
take social peace and accord into account. One user commented: 
“Bangladesh is a secular country. Therefore, we are living here together, even 
having different religious faiths. But some criminals take advantage of this in 
the name of religion and suppress other religions. Being a Muslim does not 
9 
 
mean that you should rebuke other believers. We never should do it irrespective 
of religion. We should not hurt others’ beliefs, and I learn it from Islam.” 
Notice that the standpoint of this user is seemingly obscure, but his words express the idea of 
coexistence. Thus, some users want to bridge the gap between races, religions, and ethnicities 
through their words. Constructive expressions in this sense are the stark opposite of the 
destructive expressions. 
 
5.2. Reason-based reactions 
 
Compared to users’ emotion-driven reactions, the evidences of their reason-based engagement 
with disinformation are relatively lower. It primarily indicates the users’ lower ability to act 
reasonably than emotionally. Two types of users are discerned based on their reasoning skills: 
users with strong reasoning skills and users with weak reasoning skills. 
 
5.2.1. Strong reasoning 
 
The analyses imply that strong reasoning ability is present among many social media users. In 
support of this statement, 133 instances of strong reasoning skills are found that is 78.70% of 
reason-based reactions. It primarily indicates that a decent portion of the social media users 
possesses strong reasoning skills who use constructive language as well. Nevertheless, it does 
not hint about how these skills are used: against or in favor of the disinformation. In the dataset, 
I find several users can draw an analogy and inference, can reason critically, and can mock to 
express denial subtly. 
In the first place, many users frequently use analogical inferences while arguing in their 
comments: Users who explicitly disapprove and who seemingly support the claims of 
disinformation use analogies and inferences to prove their points. In such comments, the users 
who disapprove of the disinformation mainly refer to three analogies. First, the present incident 
is identical to many other disinformation incidents. Previously, such disinformation was 
produced by Muslim perpetrators to trap the Hindus and Buddhists. Second, the geopolitical 
ambience of the sub-continent is hostile. They hypothesize that the anti-Hindu sentiment in 
Bangladesh could be a result of the anti-Muslim sentiment in India. Third, Muslims have a 
real-life gain if they can evict Hindus from their lands. It mainly refers to the Enemy Property 
Act 1968. A user commented: 
“This time, it is the conspiracy against the Hindus of Narail. It is nothing but an 
imitation of the Nasirnagar tragedy: no one condemned those people who were 
behind the scene. But the Hindus had to suffer without committing any crime, 
had to endure the assault of thousands of beasts [sic]. The state is silent too on 
this issue.” 
Notice that this statement refers to a man-made crisis that ravaged the Hindu community in 
Nasirnagar in 2016. This comment, in one way, tries to justify that the present event is 
disinformation and, in another way, accuses the state and the public for supporting and 
digesting the disinformation silently. Many users similarly claim that the present 
disinformation is intended only to perish the Hindu minorities. 
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On the other hand, (quasi-)supporters of the disinformation infer in some other ways, 
mainly referring to the blasphemy laws of other countries that set extreme punishment for the 
guilty. They also try to indicate that the Hindus are much tolerated in Bangladesh, unlike in 
India where Muslims are tortured repeatedly and hacked to death. One user stated: “I think 
Hindus are quite safe in our Muslim country [Bangladesh]. See the condition of Muslims in 
India and India-controlled Kashmir.” This statement covertly supports the disinformation but 
with more vague reasoning compared to the previous group of users. 
Some users also take satirical and anti-fanatic stances in their comments. While the satirical 
stance tends to deny the opposite view, the anti-fanatic stance tends to reject the communal 
attitude. Most of the satires implicitly refuse the statement of disinformation along with the 
statements of those who believe the disinformation. One satire is: “Oh my God! How Rajkumar 
[the accused] earned so much power to defame the Prophet (PBUH)?” [Sic] This statement 
expresses the user’s wonder and disbelief regarding the disinformation. The question mark in 
the last sentence implies that no one might have that power to defame the Prophet, so people 
should not unnecessarily display their irrational destructive reactions. 
 
5.2.2. Weak reasoning 
 
The dataset contains only 36 instances of users’ weak reasoning skills, which is 21.30% of the 
reason-based reaction. The huge gap between the strong and weak analytical skills of social 
media users is a somewhat positive sign. It might infer that most users have strong reasoning 
skills, which means they try to reasonably evaluate the disinformation to some extent. Four 
groups of users have weak reasoning skills: (i) they promptly believe the disinformation 
without any analysis; (ii) they express doubt about the disinformation; (iii) they try to show 
some reasoning skills, but fail and end up making no inference or conclusion; (iv) they demean 
others to establish their viewpoints without presenting any reasonable arguments. First, these 
users promptly believe and take the disinformation for granted because of their lower analytical 
ability. They are more susceptible to disinformation. Second, some users do not take any side 
as they are uncertain about the provided information whether it is true or false. It is because 
they do not how to evaluate/examine the (dis)information. Therefore, they find it comfortable 
to be in a doubtful position. They either vaguely pose questions or request others not to take a 
stand before verifying the information. One doubtful comment is: “It could be a fake ID, so we 
should not go for any action at first. We often involve wrongdoing because of our excitement.” 
As we see, standpoints of such statements are not clear: do such comments support or deny the 
disinformation? Third, some users attempt to use reasons but fail to reach to any conclusion 
due to their incompetence in reasoning. They tend to use sober language and demands some 
actions vaguely based on unsubstantiated reasons. Fourth, the lack of reasoning skills provokes 
some users to demean others to promote their views. For example: “It [the disinformation] is 
nothing but the act of hypocrite mullahs.” These comments contain instances of weak 
reasoning. The commenters fail to draw appropriate analogies, inferences, and arguments to 
support their claims. Thus, their comments, either in favor or against the disinformation, do not 




6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
6.1. Objectives and key findings 
 
This study aimed to find out how social media users react to religious disinformation. 
Following a quantitative content analysis, the findings show several propensities, but probably 
the most interesting one is that most users react to disinformation emotionally than reasonably. 
Previous studies on social media disinformation take only a few factors into account: impacts 
of disinformation in politics (Broersma & Graham, 2012, 2013; Faris et al., 2017; Posetti & 
Matthews, 2018); how social media users respond to fake news (Tandoc et al., 2020); online 
disinformation in enabling communalism (Al-Zaman, 2019); disinformation sharing behavior 
(Altay et al., 2020; Mookherjee, 2019; Verdizada, 2017); and typology of disinformation 
(Buckner, 1965; Haque, 2019; Jr et al., 2018). We may also see that most of these researches 
are impact studies. 
The present study produces three novel findings. First, social media users’ reactions to 
religious disinformation can be understood by two different but slightly intersecting sets of 
reactions: emotion-driven reaction and reason-based reaction. While most users react 
emotionally to disinformation, some users use their reasoning skills to support or demystify it. 
It suggests that religious disinformation to many users is like persuasive stories. Historically, 
storytelling enriches Bangladeshi society and culture, and the emotional appeal of religious 
stories is not new in the country: from literature to folklore to public discussion, religious 
stories are everywhere, as well as popular (Chandan et al., 2017; Uddin, 2006). For this reason, 
it is possible that social media users perceive religious disinformation as a story, and react to it 
emotionally. Also, their emotional and trust level suggest that religious disinformation matches 
their prior beliefs (Buckner, 1965; Jameson, 2001; Roeckelein, 2006), that is, Hindus or 
Buddhists or Jews could endanger Islam. Emotional attachment to the topic of disinformation 
also plays a pivotal role here. This could be a reason that religion as a sensitive and interesting 
issue in Bangladeshi society generates more intense and emotion-driven reactions among social 
media users. The new wave of Islamic revivalism (Islam & Islam, 2018) could also be 
responsible for this tendency. 
Second, more users show diverse forms of destructive reactions when they interact with 
disinformation, which includes hatred, anger, frustration, use of vile language, racial and 
xenophobic expressions, threat and humiliation, teasing, and malediction. In short, users show 
hostility and verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Rancer, 1996; Infante & Wigley, 1986; 
Littlejohn & Foss, 2009) when they encounter online religious disinformation: though it is a 
common behavior of social media users (Bekiari & Pachi, 2017). Previous studies (Littlejohn 
& Foss, 2009) show that such behaviors could have four reasons: psychopathology, disdain for 
others, social learning of aggression, and deficiency in argumentative skills. The findings show 
that some users have lack of argumentative skills, and many have disdain for others. However, 
this study cannot confirm that if the users’ destructive behavior is a resultant of 
psychopathology and social learning of aggression. Instead, from the hate speeches and 
offense-talking observed in the dataset, the techniques of religious disinformation and its public 
reactions suggest the presence of hate spin, a systematic process of cornering the minorities in 
12 
 
both virtual and real space (George, 2017). We have already discussed with examples that how 
online communal disinformation leads to unwelcoming offline consequences in India, 
Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Recently, Bangladesh has become the top country in persecuting 
religious minorities (Hasnat, 2017), and after 30 years no Hindu will be left in the country if 
the persecution persists, research suggests (Hasan, 2016). Now more studies should pay 
attention to the offline impacts of online communal disinformation over religious minorities in 
Bangladesh. 
Third, although more users have strong reasoning skills, only a few of them show 
constructive reactions after encountering disinformation. Possession of strong reason skills is 
one of the users’ positive traits, though it does not indicate the users’ capability to demystify 
disinformation. Rather, it suggests that more users are capable of evaluating disinformation, 
choosing a position, drawing analogies and inferences, and presenting evidence and arguments 
in support of their positions (Kurtz et al., 1999). However, it is not clear that how many users 
believe disinformation and argue in favor of that. But the findings hint that the users who deny 
disinformation have more constructive reasoning capability than the users who believe 
disinformation. The findings also suggest that many users believe disinformation, which may 
support the findings of Kumar et al. (2016), Verdizada (2017), and Tandoc et al. (2020). Its 
reason could be, as mentioned earlier, that disinformation as a story satisfies the prior belief 
and interest of the users, convincing them to believe it: In this case, such users are uncritical or 
have weak reasoning skills (Buckner, 1965; Jameson, 2001). 
Overall, the results show some positive and negative tendencies of social media users’ 
reactions to disinformation. Users’ intense destructive reactions mostly against the religious 
minorities may create religious disharmony in both social media and physical society, throwing 
them into a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). On the contrary, the constructive 
reaction is useful for congruence among religious communities, although its instances are 
limited. Further, users’ strong reasoning skills indicate a positive tendency, while weak 
reasoning skills hint at their cognitive deficiency. There is a possibility that the users with weak 
reasoning skills may work as a transmitter of disinformation (Buckner, 1965). What is more 
pressing is that more users tend to react emotionally than reasonably to online disinformation: 
Emotional users can easily be deceived by the distorted facts of disinformation. 
 
6.2. Limitations and significance 
 
This study has some limitations. First, it mainly focuses on Bangladesh so the result may not 
be generalized for other countries. Second, weighing Facebook reactions should include not 
only users’ comments but also their emojis, so the textual data (i.e., users’ comments) used in 
this study may not reflect the overall picture. Third, the sample size of this study was relatively 
smaller than the previous studies on disinformation (e.g., Tandoc et al., 2020). Apart from these 
limitations, this study has a contribution in the field of internet research. First, it bridges two 
important fields of research: religious studies and online communication. Also, although online 
religious disinformation is a pressing issue in Bangladesh, little research has been done so far: 
the analysis of Facebook comments in the Bangla language is unique in the research arena as 
well. Therefore, this study would inspire and guide more researchers. Finally, the analysis of 
social media data using a qualitative content analysis method is relatively novel in the field of 
13 
 
social science and humanities in Bangladesh. Therefore, the present study would be a good 
addition to the stream of digital research methodology. To forecast its academic and policy 
value, this study would help academics to understand the important aspects of users’ reaction 
to religious disinformation to consider in future studies. Also, religious intolerance in 
Bangladesh is mushrooming along with social media communication. Therefore, for better 
decision-making and protective measures, policymakers need to understand how social media 
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